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THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR LABOR STANDARDS:
A LAYMAN'S GUIDE
Thomas 1.Palley'
I.

Introduction
The place of labor standards in the global economy has figured prominently
in recent discussions of trade and globalization. Labor standards figured prominently
in the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, and they
promise to figure prominently in discussions about a proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). Labor standards represent a critical issue for both the American
labor movement and the international trade union movement as they are central to
making globalization work for working people.
At the analytical level, there are a number of different approaches that can be
taken regarding this issue. These include a "human rights" approach, an "equal
treatment with property" approach, and an "economic" approach.
The "human rights" approach makes a compelling case on its own. The
argument is that work is central to self-identity, personal development, and personal
fulfilment. Most adults spend a large portion of their time at work, and because work
is so central to personal identity and development, people should have some core
rights at work.
The "equal treatment with property" approach begins by recognizing that we
have steadily enacted standardized global protections for property and investors
through numerous trade and investment agreements. It then argues that if property
and capital have been given such rights, then working people should also be given
similar rights.
This paper details the "economic case" for labor standards which constitutes
an affirmative self-standing case and adds another dimension to the debate. When it
is joined with the "human rights" and "equal treatment with property" approaches, it
means not only are labor standards the ethically right course of action, but they are
also the economically right course of action.
The clear policy implication of the economic approach is that the International
Labor Organization's (ILO) core labor standards should be a central element of the
system of global governance now being constructed, and all countries should be given
appropriate incentives to conform to these standards. The WTO and the international
financial institutions (consisting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank (WB), and the multilateral regional development banks) should all officially
promote labor standards as part of their "core mission." With regard to the
.Thomas I. Palley is Assistant Director of Public Policy at the AFL-CIO in Washington,
D.C. Dr. Palley manages a team of economists who develop AFL-CIO policy positions
on a range of domestic and international economic matters such as the changing nature
of labor markets, domestic monetary and fiscal policy, the impacts of globalization, and
the stability of the international financial system. His areas of specialization are
macroeconomics and international finance, and his numerous publications focus on the
role of debt in the business cycle and the relation between inflation and unemployment.
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international financial institutions (IFIs), their articles of agreement require them to
adopt policies that are "economically justified." Therefore, the fact there is a robust
economic case for labor standards is especially important.
All too often opponents of labor standards seek to present labor standards
as standing in opposition to trade. This representation is a distortion. The question
is not whether to trade, but what the rules should be that govern trade. Trade, like
labor standards, should be viewed as an instrument for development Viewed from this
perspective, optimal development policy calls for trade with labor standards.
I.

Labor standards: what they are
Before turning to the details of the economic case for labor standards, it is
worth briefly describing the ILO's core labor standards. They consist of five core
standards: three are prohibitive in character and two are affirmative.' The three
prohibitive standards ban: (1) labor market discrimination including discrimination by
race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or political opinion; (2) forced or compulsory labor,
with limited exceptions for military service and national emergencies; and (3)
exploitative child labor. 2 The baseline minimum working age is set at fifteen, though if
a country is insufficiently developed or only light work is involved, the age can be
lower. For hazardous occupations the minimum working age is raised to eighteen.
The two affirmative standards grant: (1) the right to freedom of association,
giving workers the right to form and join organizations of their own choosing, including
unions. 3 Though the focus is clearly on unions, this right is more extensive and
includes other social activities. Also, governments may not dictate the form,
affiliations, or internal operations of these organizations. (2) Also included is the right
of workers to engage in collective bargaining with employers who cannot discriminate
against workers who join trade unions. 4 Moreover, governments must encourage
voluntary collective bargaining.
It is important to recognize that these five core labor standards are
.qualitative in nature, and almost akin to rights. There is widespread misapprehension
that core labor standards are "quantitative" in nature, and that they set regulations
such as a global minimum wage or a global standard work week. Such quantitative
standards clearly depend on a country's level of economic development, and therefore
have to be set by reference to specific national conditions. Core labor standards are
qualitative in nature, akin to economic rights, and should apply regardless of a
country's stage of development. Unfortunately, all too often in the debate labor
standards are misrepresented as involving requirements such as a global minimum
wage.
!l1

Case for labor standards
In many regards the developmental histories of the industrialized countries
provide the strongest evidence in favor of labor standards. Their histories make
I See International Labor Organization, About the ILO: Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work (June 18, 1998), available at http://us.ilo.org/aboutilo/
declaration.htm (last modified June 30, 2000).
2id.
31d.
4id.
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abundantly clear, in concrete fashion, why there is a need for the type of rights
embodied in core labor standards. No country has achieved successful democratic
market development without giving workers these rights.
This argument is clearly illuminated by reference to American economic
history. Over the course of the nineteenth century the United States was marked by
the formation of an integrated national economy. The steamboat, the railroad, the
telegraph, and later, the internal combustion engine, all contributed to fusing together
the then existing separate regional economies into a unified national economy.
This process of national integration was marked by many of the same
problems seen today in the global economy. Thus, workplace conditions were unsafe,
wages were low, and employment conditions were marked by exploitation of the sort
described in Upton Sinclair's epic novel about the meat-packing industry, The Jungle.5
There was widening income and wealth inequality, and the shortage of demand
generated by workers' inability to buy the things they produced contributed to periodic
gluts. The economy was marked by periodic destructive cyclical fluctuations, the
worst of which was the Great Depression of the 1930s. These conditions, combined
with lack of representation of working people also made for political conflict. The
history parallels today's process of globalization, which is breaking down barriers
between national economies and forging an integrated global economy.
The United States' multi-faceted response saved the system from itself. The
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 began the process of creating a body of law guarding
against corporate abuse of monopoly power. 6 In 1913, the Federal Reserve System was
established to manage and ensure the soundness of the banking system, and the
Securities Exchange Commission was established in 1934 to ensure the probity and
soundness of securities markets The resonance of these measures with today's
debate over need for reform of the international financial architecture is striking.
However, the creation of anti-trust laws and a system of financial regulation was but
part of the solution. Another critical component was the introduction of national labor
standards. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 gave workers the rights of
freedom of collective association, and enshrined the right to form and join unions and
bargain collectively.8 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 went a step further and
established both a national minimum wage and rules on overtime predicated upon a
standard forty hour week. 9 In 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Act established a new agency to oversee the workplace environment, and in the same
year the Environmental Protection Agency was established to oversee the broader
environment.'0
5

UPTON

SINcLALR, THE JUNGLE (Heritage Press 1965) (1905).
Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7)
(1994).
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77(b)-(e), 770), 77(k), 77(m), 77(o), 77(s), 78(a)-(o), 78(o)(3), 78(p)-78(hh), and
Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6,38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended generally 12 U.S.C. and
31 U.S.C. §409) (1913).
8National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1988).
9Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), 29 U.S.C.S. §§201 et seq.
'oOccupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1970).
6
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It is no accident that all of the above legislation was explicitly applied at the
federal level to stop a race to the bottom amongst the states. Reviewing the history of
interaction between U.S. inter-state commerce and national labor law, legislators have
always been keenly aware of the problem of "social dumping" that can result if laws are
applied on a piecemeal state-by-state basis." In Europe, exactly the same story can be
told, and a similar outcome has been achieved through the application of a "social
clause" to the entire European Union.
The goal of this legislation was to improve financial markets and raise
workplace standards. The changed nature of labor relations encouraged firms to
enhance productivity by innovation rather than exploitation. It also ensured that
working people received the income needed to buy what they produce, thereby solving
the problem of demand shortages that underlay gluts and depressions. This in turn
made for deep developments based on robust mass markets, and enabled us to harvest
the benefits of mass production which requires mass consumption. Higher wages also
reduced wealth and income inequality, which in turn reduced political conflict. Finally,
the development of trade unions contributed to the emergence of healthy politics in
which cronyism and monopolistic tendencies are largely blocked
National economic integration was the problem of yesteryear global economic
integration is the problem of today. However, the two share a common underlying
economic logic, and it is for this reason that the family of policy responses that worked
earlier remain relevant. The lessons of the past can serve as a useful guide for today's
problems, but there is one enormous difference. National economic integration took
place within a single national jurisdiction. Global integration is taking place across
national jurisdictions, and this makes reaching solutions a far more difficult affair.
Reflection upon the history of the industrialized economies helps make
concrete the economic case for labor standards, but such reflection must be backed by
abstract analytic reasoning. With regard to labor market discrimination, not only is it
morally repugnant, but it is also economically inefficient. Discrimination means that
society is failing to fully use the economic potential of all its members.
The issue of child labor is more complicated. In its most extreme form, child
labor is abusive, but child labor also has a "stage of development" dimension that calls
for a more nuanced discussion. Child labor has a long history of use in family owned
farms, and it was certainly used at an earlier stage in American agriculture. That said,
it is also clear that over the medium term, human capital accumulation is key to
development Having children in school, rather than earning a meager family income
supplement, therefore constitutes good development policy. For this reason, rules that
prompt developing countries to move in this direction are a good thing.
However, successful eradication of child labor requires more than just
promulgation of laws banning this practice. It also requires three other interventions.
First, governments must invest in education and provide schools and school teachers.
If children are to be taken out of the workplace in the name of educating them, then
they must have schools in which they can learn. Second, jobs must pay wages on
which a family can subsist. This is why labor standards relating to freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining are so important. Child labor exists
because it helps supplement family incomes. If policy makers act to stop children from

" Bruce Elmslie and William Milberg, Free Trade and Social Dumping: Lessonsfrom the
Regulation of U.S. InterstateCommerce, Challenge, May-June 1996, at 46.
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working, then adult workers must be able to support their families. Third, there is a
need forjobs. Not only must jobs pay families supportive wages, but there must also
be a sufficient supply of jobs so that adult workers can earn those wages. Once again
this is where the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining enter since,
as argued below, these rights contribute to economic growth and development.
The above arguments illustrate the inter-dependent and synergistic nature of
development policy. Policies often only work if implemented collectively, and there are
also considerable synergies so that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. It
is tempting to view abusive child labor as a problem caused by a few bad actors, and
that the passing of laws prohibiting it will make it go away. The reality is that child
labor is a developmental problem that is linked to bad labor market conditions.
Consequently, laws prohibiting child labor must be accompanied by policies that tackle
underlying labor market conditions.
These reflections on child labor lead naturally to the consideration of the case
for rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining. These rights are key, and
absent them the other core labor standards - prohibiting discrimination, forced labor,
and exploitative child labor - are unlikely to amount to much in practice. Thus, it will
be impossible to create both the labor market conditions needed to eliminate child
labor, and the political conditions needed to bar discrimination and forced labor.
Paradoxically, despite their essential nature, it is the rights of freedom of
association and collective bargaining that are usually viewed with the greatest hostility
by critics of labor standards. Thus, some support a prohibition on exploitative child
labor while opposing rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Yet
it is only through these rights that effective prohibition can be achieved. Proponents
of these rights are accused of being "hidden protectionists" and "promoting labor
market distortions." Both of these charges are wrong and miss the point since these
rights spur both economic and political development.
For the last twenty five years policy makers have been guided by what has
become termed "the Washington Consensus." This has involved pushing a
development agenda that emphasizes export-led growth, financial liberalization,
privatization and fiscal austerity, and the elimination of labor market protections. Yet,
it is now becoming clear that this agenda has not produced faster growth. Indeed, the
opposite is true as is shown in Table 1.12 World economic per capita Gross Domestic
Product C'GDP") growth has been slower in the period after 1980, the period of
globalization, and the slowdown has been sharpest amongst low income countries.
There is also evidence that income inequality has widened both within and between
countries.13 If the history of the U.S. is any guide, rising wages and improved income
distribution are key to deep development based on the growth of robust domestic
markets. Yet, the Washington Consensus has promoted "enclave" development, as
See Appendix.
11 See Branko Milanovic, True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First
Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone (World Bank 1999). See Jared
12

Bernstein & Lawrence Mishel, A Comparison of Income, Wage, & Employment Trends of

AdvancedIndustrialEconomies,Beware the U.S. Model: Jobs and Wages in a Deregulated
Economy (Lawrence Mishel & John Schmitt, eds., Economic Policy Institute 1995). See
Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein & John Schmitt, The State of Working America,
1998-99 (Economic Policy Institute 1999).
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exemplified by export processing zones. Such zones are the modem equivalent of the
earlier plantation economy.
The Washington Consensus approach to growth is now being discredited by
development outcomes. At this stage there is need for a new model of development
that is inclusive and rooted in robust domestic market development. The problem with
the Washington consensus export-led model is that it fails to promote deep domestic
development. Doing so requires growing wages and an improved distribution of
income. This is the foundation of a virtuous circle of growth in which rising wages
encourage market development, and market development promotes rising wages. Labor
standards are key to this new model. Rodrik reports that democracies pay higher
wages.4 I have found that income distribution is more equal and wages are higher in
countries with better rights of freedom of association. 5 These findings qualify
Rodrik's arguments about democracy. Democracy matters because it promotes freedom
of association, but it is freedom of association that actually generates improved income
distribution and higher wages in labor markets. From an economistfs perspective this
makes sense since labor standards are the actual instrument of intervention which
changes labor market outcomes. Finally, in another paper, I report evidence that
improvements in rights of freedom of association correlate with faster growth. 6
These arguments run counter to the thinking in the mainstream economics
profession which maintains that unions are a market distortion, and that income
distribution does not matter for development. Far from being a market distortion that
lowers employment, unions are in fact a private sector solution to market failure - and
that market failure is the huge imbalance of power that exists between individual
workers and business. Economic efficiency, according to the mainstreamds own
economic logic, requires the absence of market power. The reality is that labor markets
are characterized by significant imbalances of power that favor firms over individual
workers. Long ago, Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth ofNations:
..JT]he common wages of labor depend everywhere upon the
contract usually made between two parties, whose interests are by
no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the master
to give as little as possible...It is not, however, difficult to foresee
which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the
advantage in the dispute...In all such disputes the masters can hold
out much longer. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few
could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment.

14

Dani Rodrik, 'Democracies pay Higher Wages," QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EcONOMICS,

CXIV (August 1999, 707 - 38.
11 See Thomas I. Palley, Labor Standards, Economic Governance, and Income
Distribution: The Cross-Country Evidence, AFL-CIO Public Policy Department
Technical Working Paper, T029, 2000.
16 See Thomas I. Palley, The Economic Case for International Labor Standards: Theory
and Some Evidence (1998), reprintedin AFL-CIO Public Policy Department Economic
Policy Paper, E036 (1999), and CAMBRIDGE J. Eco. (forthcoming); see also OECD, TRADE,
EMPLOYMENT AND

LABOR

INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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(1996).

A

STUDY

OF

CORE

WORKER'

RIGHTS

AND

20011

THE ECONOAiCCASE FOR LABOR STANDARDS

In the long run the workman may be as necessary to his master as
his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate." 7
These conditions still hold in labor markets, and particularly so in developing countries
where social safety nets are lacking. Moreover, the employer advantage has been
increased by the growth of capital markets which gives firms enhanced access to
capital, and by technological developments that have increased the mobility of
business. Seen in this light, unions correct the imbalance of power and create a level
playing field, and are a corrective to market failure.
A second contribution of labor standards concerns the promotion of good
governance and reduction of corruption. There is now growing recognition that
development depends on good governance. The IMF now talks of a "second
generation reform" approach. 8 First generation reform was predicated on a hydraulic
model of economics which had the IMF asserting that all that was needed for growth
and development was for countries to get their exchange rates, interest rates, and
budget deficits right. Now there is awareness that institutions are essential for
development. Transparency, accountability, and good governance help prevent
misallocation of resources and guard against kleptocratic government.
Labor standards fit with this new approach. Freedom of association and
unions can be viewed as creating the countervailing powers that can check such
practices. The mainstream counter is that open markets can compete away the problem
of corruption, yet the reality is that open markets simply get captured by corruption.
The logic of capture can be understood by considering the problem of bribery which
partakes of the prisoner's dilemma. In Figure 1, the problem is illustrated by two firms,
each of which must make a decision whether to bribe or not bribe. If one firm bribes
and the other does not, then it receives a pay-off of 7 while the firm that does not bribe
receives 0. If neither bribes, each receives a pay-off of 5: and if both bribe, each
receives a pay-off of 3. This pay-off structure captures the fact that bribery is wasteful,
and allocating business on the basis of bribes promotes economic inefficiency.
Despite this, a decentralized market will only sustain an equilibrium in which both firms
bribe. The socially optimal equilibrium involves no bribery, but each firm has a private
incentive to defect and bribe. Consequently, absent legal prohibition of bribery and
enforcement of anti-bribery measures, the market will generate a sub-optimal
equilibrium in which bribery flourishes. Political action is needed to deal with the
problem of bribery. Labor standards and the promotion of the right of freedom of
association - which extends beyond just the right to join trade unions -- can be viewed
as fostering political conditions supportive of such measures. In this regard, crosscountry evidence shows that countries with improved freedom of association are
marked by lower corruption, greater economic security, and are more democratic. 19

17 A AM SMITH, THE W EALTH OF NATIONS,

1936.

Is See generally International Monetary Fund, Conference on Second Generation
Reforms, at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/fi/seminar/1999/reforms/ (in Nov. 1999,
the IMF held a conference in Washington, D.C. entitled Second Generation Reforms
to explain their new philosophy).
19 See Thomas I. Palley, Labor Standards, Economic Governance, and Income
Distribution: The Cross-Country Evidence, T029, (2000) (unpublished paper, on file
with the AFL-CIO Public Policy Department).
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Another argument in favor of labor standards is that by promoting good
governance, they draw on all elements of civil society which in turn facilitates
economic crisis management. Such reasoning is supported by the experiences of South
Korea and Indonesia in face of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997.20 In many
regards these two countries were similar in terms of stage of economic development,
but South Korea had begun a process of democratization and implementation of
improved labor standards. As a result, it was able to put together a coherent national
response to the crisis, whereas Indonesia found itself politically divided and unable to
craft a similar response. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that countries with
improved labor standards appear to be less susceptible to financial crisis.2' A possible
explanation for this finding is that financial markets recognize the benefits of sound
civil society institutions and give economies with such institutions more financial
space.
Not only are labor standards good for developing countries, they can also
benefit the international economy. In this sense, they represent a win - win policy.
Today, the international economy is afflicted by the contradictions of export-led
growth. The export-led growth paradigm embodies "the fallacy of composition"
whereby it works when just one country pursues such policy, but fails when all
countries pursue export-led growth simultaneously. This is because one country's
exports are another's imports, and all cannot therefore run trade surpluses. If all try to
grow on the back of demand growth in other countries, the inevitable result is a
shortage of demand and global deflation.' Recognition of this contradiction compels
the need for a new development strategy that has countries grow their domestic
markets. This in turn brings questions of wages, income distribution, and labor
standards to the fore.
For developing countries, a particular manifestation of the contradictions of
export-led growth is the problem of declining terms of trade. This is an old problem first
identified by Hans Singer (1950) and Raoul Prebisch (1950).23 The Singer-Prebisch
findings concerned commodity prices, but today there is some evidence that the world
economy may have entered a new era in which terms of trade for low end manufactured
goods are also subject to secular decline. 24 Consequently, developing countries have
2° See Ajit Singh, Asian Capitalismand the Financial Crisis, in

GLOBAL INSTABILITY: THE

POLITICALECONOMY OF WORLD ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE (Jonathan Michie

& John Grieve-

Smith, eds., 1999).
21 See Thomas I. Palley, Is There a Relationship Between the Quality of Governance and
Financial Crises? Evidence from the Crises of 1997 (200 1)(unpublished paper, on file
with the AFL-CIO Public Policy Department).
2 See Thomas I. Palley, Applied Fix-PriceMacro Models: A Reconstruction, 18 ATLANTIC
ECON. J. 1 (1990) (The economic logic of exporting deflationary conditions by poaching
demand in other countries is very clear in Keynesian macroeconomic models of the
international economy).
23 See Hans W. Singer, The Distributionof GainsBetween Investingand Borrowing Countries,
40 Am.ECON. REV. 473 (1950); R. Prebisch, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPmENTOF LATIN AMERICA
(1950).
Kaplinsky,
Export
Processing
Zones
in the Dominican Republic: Transforming
2 See Raphael
1851, 1851-1865 (1993); Vito
DEVELOPMENT
WORLD
27
Commodities,
into
Manufactures
Antonio Muscatelli, Andrew A. Stevenson & Catia Montagna, Intra-NIE Competition in
AND LATIN AMERICA AND ITS PRINCIPLE PROBLEM
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to export ever more just to maintain existing export earnings. This exacerbates financial
instability since countries need earnings to service their foreign debts, and the need
for earnings then drives prices down further. Part of the solution must therefore have
these countries consume more of what they produce, thereby reducing supply on the
international market and driving prices up. But for this to happen countries will have
to improve their patterns of income distribution.
In addition to creating deflationary international macroeconomic conditions,
export-led growth is also marked by an incentive structure that encourages a race to
bottom. This incentive structure parallels that of the problem of bribery -- which can
be viewed as a race to the bottom in corporate business practice. In an export-led
growth world every country tries to gain an international competitive advantage by
exploiting every possible margin. Good competition focuses on productivity and
quality; bad competition eats away at workplace safety, the environment, and income
distribution. Labor standards can contribute to ruling out the bad competition
equilibrium by blocking countries from gaining a competitive advantage by eroding
standards. This logic is illustrated in Figure 2, 25 where the payoff structure compared
to eroding standards gives each country an incentive to do so. Though all would be
better off in a world with standards, the private incentive is to lower standards and,
consequently, that is the equilibrium which the market supports when left to itself.26
Interestingly, the race to the bottom has been widely viewed as an issue of North South competition, but there is now evidence that it may be even more acute amongst
southern countries. An examination of the Pakistani soccer ball industry which agreed
to do away with child labor, only found that production then moved to India which had
no restrictions on child laborY
In sum, labor standards can help block-off the "race to the bottom" that
export-led growth encourages. And by improving income distribution in developing
economies, it can contribute to the promotion of domestic market-based development,
thereby shifting the direction and dynamic of growth away from exclusive reliance on
export markets. This will allow workers in developing countries to consume and enjoy
more of their productivity.
IV.

Labor standards and global governance

The above arguments explain why labor standards are good development
policy, and this is why they should become a core part of global governance. The
nternational Labor Organization (ILO) has a critical role to play in regard to the
Exports ofManufactures, 37 J. INr-L ECoN./ 29, 29-47 (1993); Prabirjit Sarkar & Hans W.
Singer, ManufacturedExports ofDeveloping Countries and their Terms of Trade Since 1965,
19 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 333, 333-340 (1991); David Sapsford & Hans W. Singer, The
IMF, the World Bank, and Commodity Prices: a Case of Shifting Sands?, 26 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT

1653, 1653-1660 (1998)

2' See Appendix.

Kate Bronfenbrenner, Final Report. The Effects of Plant Closing or Threat of Plant
Closing on the Right of Workers to Organize (1996) (unpublished paper, Cornell
University) (evidence of a race to the bottom in the context of NAFTA).
27 Gainseli Berik, What HappenedAfter Paldstan's Soccer Ball Industry Went Child Free,
Address at the Child Labor Conference at the Graduate School of Social Work,
University of Utah (May 7-8, 2001).
26
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monitoring of labor standards. Only it has the capability to monitor and advise
governments on issues of enforcement, and for these reasons it should be
strengthened.
More sunlight is always better than less, and the ILO can expose countries
that fail to comply with labor standards. But the IFIs must also be brought in. The
economic development benefits of labor standards and their positive impact on
developing country financial stability mean that they are consistent with the Articles
of Agreement of both the IMF and the WB. Both the IMF and the WB are in the
"business of development," and that is why labor standards should be part of their
standard policy agenda. To this effect, the IMF should make the following policy
changes: in Article IV the country reviews should be an express report on country
adherence to labor standards. Enhanced Structural Adjustment Loans (ESAFs) should
be made conditional on a requirement that countries have in place plans to conform to
core labor standards within a reasonable time frame, and the same requirement should
hold for countries to have access to Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The World Bank
should ensure that Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), which guide all bank
lending, should incorporate a program for implementation and enforcement of labor
standards. All loans are already screened with regard to their environmental impact,
and they should now also be made subject to a "Core labor Standards" screen. Finally,
core labor standards need to be made part of the WTO's system of governance of
international trade. Just as the WTO has in place global rules for the protection of
intellectual property rights that are backed with legal sanctions, so to there is a need
to design a system that protects labor rights.
V.

Conclusion

Opponents of core labor standards view these standards as rich country imperial
bullying, hidden protection for industrialized countries, and a distortion of markets.
None of these charges stand up to close examination. The charge that labor standards
are a form of hidden protection, aimed at giving unfair protection to workers in
industrialized countries by taking away the comparative advantage of workers in
developing countries, fails to recognize the benefits of labor standards both for
developing countries and the global economy. The charge that labor standards are a
form of market distortion is fundamentally wrong in that it fails to recognize the huge
imbalances ofbargaining power that exists between individual workers and employers.
Market efficiency is predicated on the absence of power, a condition that manifestly
does not hold in labor markets anywhere. Seen in this light, labor standards are in fact
a corrective of market failure.
The reality is that labor standards are good economic policy: good for
developing countries, good for developed countries, and good for the international
economy. In this they resonate with Polanyi's classic insights of the need for
successful market economies to be properly embedded into societies.27 The IMFs
Second Generation Reform approach embeds a new realization of the importance of
good institutions for successful development, and represents a movement away from
the "hydraulic" economic development policy which talked of simply getting prices and
the budget deficit right. Labor standards fit squarely within this new paradigm, being
an institution that promotes development. The world community has repeatedly
27KARL POLANYI,

THE

GREAT TRANSFORMATION

(Beacon Press 1944).
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endorsed labor standards at the Copenhagen Summit, through the Singapore WTO
ministerial declaration, and at the ILO. Now, it is time for the world community to match
these endorsements with actions that make core labor standards an integral part of the
global system of governance. Labor standards are not a matter of left versus right:
they are a matter of right versus wrong.

194

RICHMOND JOURNAL OFGLOBAL LA WAND BUSINESS

[Vol. 2:2

Appendix
FnmiA

Not Bribe

Bribe

Not Bribe

A. Anti-Bribery Convention (5,5)

B. (0,7)

Bribe

C. (7,0)

D.No AntiBribery
Convention (3,3)

FmnB

Figure 1. The problem of bribery as represented in terms of the prisoner's dilemma.
Numbers in parentheses are payoffs (to Firm B, to Firm A).

CountryA

Maintain Standards

Lower Standards

Maintain Standards

A. Core Labor Standards (5,5)

B. (0,7)

Lower Standards

C. (7,0)

D.No Core Labor

Country B

Standards (33)

Figure 2. The race to the bottom as represented in terms of the prisoner' s dilemma.
Numbers in parentheses are payoffs (to Country B, to Country A).
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1965-1989
1965-1980

1989-1989
1980-1989

1999-1996
1990-1996

Low and middle income counrnes

5.9

3.1

1.9

High income cotmtrnes

3.8

3.2

1.7

United States

2.7

3.0

2.5

Japan

6.6

4.1

1.2

4.1

3.1

1.8

World

Table 1. Trends in GDP growth for developing regions and the industrialized
countries, 1965 - 1996 (average annual % growth). Source: Singh, supra note 20.

